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ABSTRACT
This article deals with the diffusion and standardization rivalry
between two similar but incompatible formats for home VCRs (video-
cassette recorders): the Betamax, introduced in 1975 by the Sony
Corporation, and the VHS (Video Home System), introduced in 1976 by
the Victor Company of Japan (Japan Victor or JVC) and then supported
by JVC's parent company, Matsushita Electric, as well as the majority of
other distributors in Japan, the United States, and Europe. Despite
being first to the home market with a viable product, accounting for the
majority of VCR production during 1975-1977, and enjoying steadily
increasing sales until 1985, the Beta formatfell behind the VHS in market
share during 1978 and declined thereafter. By the end of the 1980s,
Sony and its partners had ceased producing Beta models. This study
analyzes the key events and actions that make up the history of this
rivalry while examining the context -- a mass consumer market with a
dynamic standardization process subject to "bandwagon" effects that
took years to unfold and were largely shaped by the strategic
maneuvering of the VHS producers.
I _ I ______L
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of a new large-scale industry (or segment of one) poses
daunting strategic challenges to innovators and potential entrants alike. Long-term
competitive positions may be shaped by the initial moves made by rivals, especially in
the development of markets subject to standardization contests and dynamic
"bandwagon" effects among users or within channels of distribution. Later entrants
are forced to contend with the advantages while they seek to exploit the disadvantages
in positions established by "first movers" - companies who first commercialize a
product or technology. While a market is developing or adapting to change, both first
movers and followers maneuver to establish a sustainable winning position.
This article explores the effects of strategic maneuvering and mass-market
dynamics among firms that pioneered the commercialization of the videocassette
recorder (VCR) for household use. By the 1980s, the VCR had become the largest
segment of the massive global consumer electronics business. The first VCRs were
developed in the early 1970s. One design, the U-Matic, developed primarily by the
Sony Corporation, soon emerged as a dominant design for professional and educational
uses. By the mid-1970s, variations of this design, embodying more integrated
electronics and narrower (1/2") tape, had resulted in similar but incompatible formats
designed for home use: the Betamax, introduced in 1975 by Sony, and the VHS
(Video Home System), introduced in 1976 by the Victor Company of Japan (Japan
Victor or JVC) and then supported by JVC's parent company, Matsushita Electric, as
well as the majority of other firms in Japan, the United States, and Europe.'
The Beta design, despite being the first compact, inexpensive, reliable, and
easy to use VCR, as well as accounting for the majority of VCR production during
1975-1977 and enjoying steadily increasing sales until 1985, fell behind the VHS in
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market share during 1978 and steadily lost share thereafter. By the end of the 1980s,
Sony and its partners had ceased producing Beta models, with Sony promoting
another standard using a smaller (8mm) tape, primarily for home movies (Tables 1 and
2). While the outlines of this competition have been discussed before, both in English
(for example, [1] [2]) and in Japanese ([3] [4]), this study examines in detail how
the VCR rivalry unfolded, why it developed as it did, and how company actions
affected the outcome.
The literatures of management and economics contain varied discussions of how
firms create and sustain profitable competitive positions in situations like this one.
First-movers potentially benefit from technological leadership, which may be
sustained through greater experience or success in patenting or R D contests.
They may be able to exploit opportunities for early acquisition of scarce critical
resources, as exotic as specialized equipment or as mundane as retail shelf-space.
First movers may benefit from the existence of buyer switching costs, from the
accumulation of above-average profits reaped while enjoying a de facto monopoly
position, or from their ability to shape product definitions, forcing followers to adapt
to a standard or to invest in order to differentiate their offerings. Followers, on the
other hand, may gain a "free ride" on investments made by the first-mover, such as
educating buyers or solving certain critical design or manufacturing problems.
Followers may also benefit from the resolution of uncertainties in the marketplace, may
be able to utilize more recent developments in technology, or take advantage of
"inertia" or inflexibility on the part of the first-mover. [5]
When an innovation is rooted in a novel and challenging technology, being a
first-mover may not be as important as having been among the pioneers in developing
that technology. [6] Firms that were technological pioneers may be able to follow the
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leader rapidly enough to neutralize inherent first-mover advantages while also
exploiting the benefits that accrue to followers. A pioneer coming second or third to
market may have better information about buyer preferences, or more time to plan
efficient manufacturing operations or organize alliances for production and
distribution. Such a firm may also be able to copy valued features of the product
first-offered, while adding others to differentiate itself. In particular, in a mass
market without patent protection or standards legislation, the time required to create
a dominant standard is so great that first mover advantages may be minimal.
In the case of the VCR, with the potential global market measuring hundreds
of millions of units, the very scale of the market created a window of opportunity for
firms with established technological capabilities to challenge the first-mover, Sony.
As demand grew in the first years at rates outstripping producers' ability to supply
it, the first "bandwagon" emerged in the formation of alliances for production and
distribution. The development of demand for a complementary product - prerecorded
tapes (usually movies) - set off the second bandwagon in the 1980s, as retail outlets
for tape rental chose to focus on stocking tapes in the format adopted by a majority of
users, though the alternative format still enjoyed substantial acceptance.
BACKGROUND
Inventors. Pioneers. Standard-Setters
Magnetic video recording technology was created in the United States, but
numerous European and Japanese companies competed and collaborated in the 1960s
and 1970s to adapt the technology to the requirements of a mass market. As discussed
in earlier articles by Rosenbloom and Cusumano [6] and Rosenbloom and Freeze [7],
Ampex Corporation, a small California company, invented a video recorder for
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broadcasting applications in 1956. This came after several years of competition with
RCA to use magnetic tape (as earlier used in audio tape recorders) to record television
signals, and freed the broadcast industry from a reliance on live performances or a
clumsy system of film recording. In the late 1950s, Sony, Japan Victor, and
Matsushita, as well as several other Japanese firms, began studying and improving
upon the $50,000-plus Ampex machine, employing novel recording-head mechanisms
and solid-state electronic circuits, as well as other product and process innovations
that allowed them to miniaturize the video recorder and dramatically reduce its price.
Design technology for video recording had been difficult for Ampex to master
but proved more difficult to protect from a select handful of companies that had made
audio tape recorders and then invested in the development of video recording.
Although Ampex retained control over important patents, Japanese firms challenged
these in Japanese courts as well as explored ways to invent around them. By the mid-
1960s, several firms in Japan, along with Ampex in the United States and Philips in
Europe, had accumulated considerable expertise in video-recording design and
manufacture.
Despite a series of products through the 1960s that did not appeal to consumers
because of still-high prices, poor picture quality, bulky housings, and inconvenient
reel-to- reel formats, theJapanese pioneers continued to improvethei r machines until,
in 1971, Sony succeeded in designing a cassette model with 3/4 inch-wide tape. This
machine, called the U-Matic, was still too large and expensive for regular home use.
Nonetheless, it found a market among schools and other institutions, and embodied the
core design concepts that served as the basis for both the Beta and VHS formats.2
In conjunction with an agreement to adopt Sony's U-Matic as a standard for
institutional machines, three Japanese firms that later competed for the home-video
standard -- Sony, Matsushita, and Japan Victor -- signed a cross-licensing agreement
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for video-recording patents in 1970 [3] [5] [6]. Philips did not join this group and
pursued its own distinctive VCR design.
While engineers and managers recognized that a standard format would be
better for consumers and producers (who would benefit from expansion of the
market), agreementon a single home video format proved impossible to reach. In fact,
Sony's experience with the U-Matic had made its engineers particularly reluctant to
cooperate in establishing or refining a new standard. As early as 1970, Sony had
appeared ready to introduce a smaller machine that used a more sophisticated
(azimuth) recording system and might have proved popular with consumers. Since
Matsushita and Japan Victor were not yet ready to mass produce this type of machine,
the U-Matic ended up as a compromise design, requiring a wide tape and large
cassette. The compromise thus forced Sony, by agreeing to support what became the
industry standard for institutional machines, to miss a potential opportunity to enter
even earlier into the home market [3] [8] [9].
Utilizing nearly two decades of experience with video-recorder design,
engineering, and manufacturing, Sony and Japan Victor both proceeded to develop
1/2 inch-wide tape VCRs for the home and introduced them in 1975 and 1976.
Meanwhile, other companies, including Ampex, RCA, Matsushita, Toshiba, Sanyo,
and Philips, introduced or experimented with alternative formats. Unlike the Sony
and JVC designs, both of which resembled the effective U-Matic design, the other
VCRs were based on distinctive design concepts which proved to be inferior to Beta
and VHS.
In addition, just as Sony's Betamax was essentially a miniaturization of the U-
Matic but with a more advanced recording technique, the VHS closely resembled the
U-Matic (and thus the Betamax), even though the recording format and tape-handling
mechanisms remained different. Accordingly, it proved difficult for Sony and Japan
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Victor, and the firms that carried their machines, to differentiate their products
through basic features. Hence, neither Beta nor VHS could gain a technological
advantage in design or manufacturing that could be sustained long enough to gain a
dominant market position. Sony did establish an advantage in reputation if not in
actual design and manufacturing skills because of its unique history as an innovator
in home video and primary inventor of the U-Matic. As discussed below, however,
Sony's first-mover role did not create a sustainable advantage in such a large,
dynamic market. Its chief competitors also had superb technical skills, while
domination of the huge global market required cooperation with other firms in mass
production, licensing, and distribution, of both hardware and software. Yet it was
by no means certain when introduced that the VHS -- which came to market after
Betamax and was backed by a small firm (JVC) with limited manufacturing and
distribution capabilities -- would prove superior in the marketplace.
The Global Mass Market
Demand for a novel consumer-electronics product can rise rapidly as masses of
new customers appear each year. In home video, for example, everyone with a
television set was a potential customer. In contrast, professional video had been a
very limited market. Machines for broadcast use were expensive and complex, and the
number of buyers equalled the number of television stations -- hundreds in the United
States, Japan, and Europe combined, not millions. As a result, one firm was able to
supply most of the new and replacement demand for many years. Ampex Corporation
had produced approximately 75% of all video recorders in use worldwide in 1962 and
was able to dominate the broadcast market for two decades after its invention of the
video recorder in 1956 [7].
The Beta and VHS models, however, opened up a true mass market, allowing
6
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video recorders to parallel and then in the early 1980s pass color television sets to
become Japan's (and the world's) top consumer electronics product in production
value [10]. The vast size and worldwide structure of this new demand made it nearly
impossible for any one firm to accommodate it alone. Annual production of home
videocassette recorders in Japan exceeded one million as early as 1978, having
commenced only in 1975, and continued to double each year until 1981. Japanese firms
exported 53%of the video recorders they produced in 1977 and approximately 80% from
1979 onward. While the top export destination was the United States during 1976-
1979, European exports consumed a larger share during 1980-1982, as VCR sales
boomed with the increasing availability of prerecorded tapes (see Table 3 and [10]).
Europe was probably a more favorable market to promote the use of software than the
United States because of the smaller number of television stations and available
broadcast programs.
Thus, the characteristics of home video -- the market's "mass" and global
nature, as well as the product's technical complexity -- meant that emergence of
efficient mass-production capacity, broad distribution channels, and clear market
preferences would require years. An early mover into the market had no guarantee
of a sustainable advantage from simply being first, but needed an effective strategy
to capitalize on its position. The need for strategic action was especially strong since
other pioneers, after observing customer reactions to the initial product offering, had
the option of moving in with a comparable product, lower prices, better features, or
superior distribution. In fact, Matsushita was known for competing in that manner:
monitoring a broad range of technical developments and gradually building up in-
house skills while waiting for Sony, Japan Victor, or other innovative consumer-
electronics firms to introduce a new product first. Matsushita would then enter the
market six months to a year later with a similar but lower-priced version, often
7
_11_ ___sl__l_____Il___·I___·____ _111_
- - ~ ~ ~ ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ... ,_~,,~ ~,......._.~. I
manufactured more efficiently due to Matsushita's mass-production skills and
willingness to invest to achieve scale economies. The scale of Matsushita
manufacturing reflected broad distribution guaranteed through an enormous domestic
sales network, which marketed products under brand names that included Panasonic,
Technics, National, and Quasar. Matsushita also could schedule large production
runs because of its willingness to sell finished products to original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs), in Japan and abroad, for sale under their labels ([3], pp.
151-154).
Theory of the Case
A VCR by itself is worthless. Users can employ it only in conjunction with a
complementary product, the videotape cassette, that is designed to conform to the
interface specification of the VCR. This is a common characteristic of contemporary
information technologies, such as the personal computer and its software programs,
compact-disc (CD) players and discs, or TV receivers and broadcast signals.
Interface standards for innovative products of this sort can be established by various
means: government regulation (FCC for television), formal agreement among a large
number of producers of the primary product (CD players), or implicit acceptance by
producers reflecting the market power of a sponsor (IBM PC).
In the case of the VCR, since no single producer or coalition was strong enough
to impose a world-wide standard, and repeated efforts to bring producers to an
agreement failed, the marketplace set the "standard." An interesting stream of
economics literature has explored the dynamics of rivalry in just such situations
[10] [11] [12]. The key factor is what economists call the "network externality, " the
fact that the value of a given product to a user is influenced not only by the product's
inherent capabilities, but also by the extent to which others also use it.
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This has two important dynamic consequences. Given rival products of
substantially equal cost and capabilities, buyers will tend to choose the one that has
been chosen, or appears likely to be chosen, by a greater number of other buyers.
Furthermore, this creates a system with a positive feedback; the perceived benefit of
choosing a given standard increases as more buyers choose it, thus increasing the
probability of purchase by others not yet in the marketplace. An early lead in this
sort of contest, however achieved, may become self-reinforcing.
The economics literature illuminates the role of the key protagonists in such
battles, the sponsors who control the propriety technology. The incentives available
to other producers of the primary product are important features of the process, and
are bound up with their perceptions of the likely outcome. The literature also shows
that there is no guarantee that the process will lead to a standard that is in some sense
"best" for users as a whole.
In the drama of the VCR standardization battle, there were three sets of
principal players: (1) the main protagonists, Sony, JVC, and Philips, sponsors of the
three principal rival formats and major producers of the core product, the VCR; (2)
the remaining consumer electronics producers, each of whom would adopt one of the
standard formats for production and/or distribution; and (3) the producers and
distributors of an important complementary product, pre-recorded software.
As it played out, the crucial battle was between Beta and VHS, Sony and JVC.
(Although Philips held on to a different standard in Europe for a decade, it never
posed a serious challenge to the other two. ) The facts are simple: Beta reached the
market first, took 58% of the market in 1975-77, and fell behind VHS in 1978. For the
next six years, sales of Beta-format VCRs increased every year while its share of the
worldwide market fell every year. Being outsold four to one by VHS in 984, Beta
sales began a rapid decline to extinction.
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The figures present the pictu re of a classic "bandwagon," with the VHS format
turning a slight early lead in sales into a dominant position. Chance events might have
produced that early lead, and the theory tells us that might be enough to explain the
outcome. The thesis of this article, however, is that the early lead and the eventual
outcome reflect the deliberate actions of the main players. Strategic maneuvering by
the principal protagonists in 1975-77 led to an alignment of producers of the core
product and exploitation of distinctive dynamics of mass production and distribution
sufficient to account for the early dominance of VHS sales. In a second phase of
rivalry, in the 1980s, the strategic alignment of producers of complementary products
reinforced theVHS advantage and hastened the demiseof Beta, which might otherwise
have survived as a second format.
EIDENE 
A three-year period, from mid-1974 to 1977, proved decisive in shaping the
emergentVCR industry and determining theoutcome of the standardization battlethat
would rage on for another decade. At the start of that period, diversity characterized
the positions of the world's largest consumer electronics companies with respect to
home video, a market that remained wholly speculative in 1974. VCR designs based
on six different incompatible formats were in late stages of development at rival
companies, and three of the majors, Hitachi, Sharp, and Zenith, had no commitments
at all to home-video development. By mid-1977, the pattern had changed sharply, as
all ten of the biggest firms were marketing home-VCRs and the industry had divided
into three "families," supporting either Sony's Beta, JVC's VHS, or the Philips
format. The line-ups, and data about each firm's color TV sales and prior VCR
10
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commitments, are identified in Table 4.
The decisive factors in the standards battle were few. First, of the six designs
being developed around the world in 1974, four were significantly flawed and destined
to fail. The Philips N-1500, Sanyo-Toshiba V-Code, and Matsushita VX designs were
marketed vigorously yet fell short, despite the introduction of second-generation
improved designs in each case. RCA's VCR design never got past the prototype stage
and managers abandoned this after they saw the Betamax. Although a later Philips
innovation, the V-2000, had many fine technical features, it was complex and costly
to manufacture, and was introduced too late to capture a viable market share.
Because of their common technical heritage in the U-Matic, the Beta and VHS
designs were closely comparable in cost and performance. Sony had a clear lead in
time; it would take JVC roughly two more years to match the stage that Sony had
achieved by late 1974. But moving first was not sufficient, in itself, to win the prize
for Beta; how Sony moved and what its principal rivals did also mattered. In
retrospect, as Akio Morita, then Sony's president, later acknowledged, he and Masaru
Ibuka, then chairman, made a "mistake" and "should have worked harder to get more
companies together in a "family" to support the Betamax format. " [13] JVC, in the
number two position, did "try harder" and was more effective at forming alliances in
support of VHS.
JVC's more effective campaign to form an alliance behind VHS produced a
coalition that matched the Beta family in global market power. JVC and its principal
ally (and parent), Matsushita, followed that with strategic commitments that gained
a decisive edge in market share for VHS, beginning in 1978. Matsushita exploited its
generic skills in mass production and substantial previous experience in VCR
manufacture by establishing production capacity for the VHS that exceeded the
combined capacities of all other Japanese VCR producers. JVC, meanwhile, moved
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aggressively to bring leading European consumer electronics firms into the VHS
family, almost preempting that market from Beta.
Strategic Alignment of Primary Producers
A set of assumptions that proved to be in conflict shaped Sony's strategy for
commercializing the Betamax. Sony's leaders believed that the Beta design was good
enough to be a winner, and they knew that they were ahead of their rivals in VCR
development. But they also understood that no producer, on its own, could establish
a VCR format, however good the design, as a recognized global standard. Thus, Sony
set out to interest other VCR pioneers in adopting the Beta format, concentrating
especially on winning the allegiance of Matsushita, its most formidable rival. But two
premises hampered their ability to recruit allies.
As Japan's leading developer of video technology, Sony believed that it should
not have to delaycommercialization of the Betamax in order to cooperate, and probably
compromise, on the development of an industry standard with other firms. As
discussed earlier, Sony managers and engineers had felt their willingness to
compromise on the U-Matic had been a competitive error. Consequently, Sony went
ahead and began manufacturing preparations for the Betamax in the fall of 1974,
before approaching other firms to discuss the prospect of their adopting the Sony
machine as an industry standard (see Appendix A).
Furthermore, Sony was reluctant to build VCRs for its licensees. Sony had
always been uniquely innovative with consumer products incorporating advanced
electronics. Its management had never before agreed to ship Sony products to other
companies for distribution under their labels, preferring to build up the Sony name
and reputation and to avoid sharing the benefits of Sony innovations with too many
levels of distributors. For example, Sony developed and marketed Japan's first
12
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audio-tape recorder (1950), stereo audio system for broadcasting (1952),
transistorized radio (1955), transistorized video-tape recorder (1958), and
transistorized micro-television (1959), as well as unique products such as the
Trinitron television, whose picture-tube technology did not follow the industry
standard established by RCA [14]. Thus, while Sony managers realized they would
have to license the Beta format to ensure its widest distribution, they were unwilling
to compromise on their standard or help potential licensees with OEM shipments.
Sony first demonstrated the Betamax to representatives of RCA, an American
video pioneer, in September 1974. At the same time, Sony began talking to JVC and
Matsushita, its U-Matic partners, about "joint development" of a home-video format.
But Sony did not manage these relationships well. When it approached the other
firms, Sony had already begun tooling-up for the Betamax, signalling to prospective
partners a commitment to proceed with mass production irrespective of their support.
Sony thus acted as a true first mover, and may have believed that its lead in the
market would convince other firms to follow. At the same time, having begun
manufacturing preparations also made Sony less flexible, because altering the design
of its machine would require expensive changes in manufacturing
equipment.
The 1974 discussions with RCA accomplished one of Sony's objectives by
persuading RCA to kill its own VCR development program, but they also brought to
light the most vulnerable aspect of the initial Beta design, its limited playing time.
RCA had given 200 of its own VCRs to U.S. customers in a market test during early
1974 and concluded that a minimum 2-hour playing time was necessary for commercial
success ([1], p.84; [15], 4/21/75).' RCA executives knew from the Betamax
demonstration that their efforts to develop VCR technology had been far surpassed
by the innovative Japanese, and they terminated their own program. But they
13
_____I_______Clj(LjI__ I-C-^__l I__ll__l__l__-^Cf_·_li·DI1
1___1_11^___··_11II)--···_)·--·--- 1 ·I-i-Pi- i
decided to wait for further progress in the technology, especially for longer playing
times, before committing to market a particular VCR.
When Sony demonstrated the Betamax to Matsushita and Japan Victor in
December 1974, Matsushita also questioned the adequacy of a 1-hour playing time
([3], pp. 13-17). These negative reactions to the Betamax then convinced managers
at Japan Victor that a successful machine would have to offer at least two hours of
playing time and strengthened their commitment to the VHS, whose development had
proceeded on this assumption anyway. Japan Victor now joined RCA and Matsushita
in declining to adopt the Beta format ([2], pp. 37-38).
Sony managers eventually realized they were not in a strong bargaining position
and decided to modify the Betamax for 2-hour recordings. Sony postponed further
licensing negotiations, losing valuable time and opportunities to continue attempts at
enlisting licensees. In particular, when Hitachi, another major producer of consumer
electronics products, showed an interest in July 1975 to license the Betamax, Sony
managers refused, insisting that the Betamax was not yet perfected and thus not
available for licensing ( [3], pp.33-34; [1 ], p. 156). It seems that Sony managers were
still primarily interested in persuading Matsushita to adopt the Beta standard, rather
than Hitachi, and knew by this time that Japan Victor was working on a competing
format that, because of Japan Victor's position as Matsushita subsidiary, Matsushita
was likely to support if Sony did not make a special effort to court its competitor.
Another problem with Hitachi was that Sony sought partners who could quickly
manufacture VCRs on their own rather than requiring Sony to provide complete
machines. Sony Chairman AkioMorita was unequivocal about this strategy, declaring
early in 1976 that, "Sony is not an OEM manufacturer" ([13], 2/16/76). In this
regard, Matsushita, which had a large manufacturing capability for VCRs based on
previous unsuccessful products, was a better fit than Hitachi, which had only made
14
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a few broadcast-use VCRs through a subsidiary and needed an OEM relationship
before it could establish in-house production ([16], pp.79-80).
Sony resumed seeking partners as soon as it revised the Betamax to play for two
hours. Top executives from Sony and Matsushita met again in March 1976 to discuss
adopting Beta as the common standard. In July, Sony demonstrated the latest machine
to Matsushita, Japan Victor, Hitachi, Sharp, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and Sanyo, and
also appealed to Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) for
support. MITI officials tried to negotiate a settlement and favored Sony in these
discussions since it already had a machine in the market. Toshiba and Sanyo
eventually agreed to back Beta, although the other firms decided to wait for the VHS,
which Japan Victor announced publicly in September 1976 ([3], pp.59-72).
In contrast to Sony, Japan Victor followed a strategy aimed at forming as large
a group as possible, aggressively pursuing both licensing and OEM agreements,
including exports (see Appendix A and Tables 5, 6, and3 above, as well as [2], p.42;
[9] [17] ). Management first established a group of adherents in Japan who could boost
JVC's manufacturing and marketing capabilities -- before completing the design and
its own preparations formanufactu re. Japan Victor initiated this process in the spring
of 1975, shortly after Sony's demonstration of the Betamax, and by the end of 1976 had
lined up Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Sharp, in addition to Matsushita. Japan Victor also
proposed an OEM relationship to Matsushita, even though the latter turned this down
because Japan Victor did not have enough capacity to supply Matsushita's huge
distribution network and Matsushita was capable of producing the VHS machine on its
own within a few months ([3], p. 54). In addition, Japan Victor agreed to provide
machines to Hitachi, whereas Sony would not, beginning shipments to Hitachi in
December 1976 [9].' In January and February 1977, Japan Victor also began
supplying VCRs to Sharp and Mitsubishi ([15], 12/13/76), which Hitachi had helped
15
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to recruit.
As a second step, towards the end of 1976, Japan Victor moved to establish a
footing in the U.S. market by negotiating with RCA. The U.S. company rejected this
offer for an OEM relationship because of Japan Victor's small production capacity ( [2]
p.46). Yet, rather than giving up on OEM agreements outside Japan, JVC turned
toward European firms, which would be satisfied with smaller quantities than RCA
needed. Japan Victor pursued these European alliances far more actively and
effectively than any other VHS or Beta producer, even after establishing a large
production base and gaining world-wide recognition for its brand-name (see Table 5).
In addition, to entice other firms to support VHS, Japan Victor was willing to let
other companies participate in refining the standard, such as in moving from two
hours to longer recording times or adding new features. Japan Victor also provided
considerable assistance in manufacturing and marketing [18]. Yet another important
difference with Sony proved to be style: Japan Victor managers approached
prospective partners in an exceedingly "polite and gentle" manner, and encouraged
them to adopt as the common VCR standard "the best system we are all working on,"
rather than the VHS per se.5 One outcome of Japan Victor's approach was that
prospective manufacturing partners truly believed they would have some stake in the
future evolution of VHS features ([2], pp. 32-33; [18]). Allowing partners to share
in development also improved the VHS in ways that Japan Victor might not have
pursued itself. For example, after Japan Victor exhibited the VHS prototype to
Matsushita in the spring of 1975, Matsushita provided technical feedback that sped the
completion of the new VCR ([1], pp.148-149). As discussed below, Matsushita also
took the lead in increasing recording and playback time after consulting with RCA.
JVC also strengthened the position of the VHS family by moving aggressively to
line-up European distribution. Philips, the leader in the consumer electronics market
16
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in Europe, still commanded less than 25% share of the market for color television in the
region. With its German ally, Grundig, the number-two producer, Philips was
producing home-VCRs based on its 1972 technology, now outmoded by the Beta and
VHS innovations. Most of the other European consumer electronics firms had earlier
marketed VCRs produced by Philips and Grundig, but by 1975 all of them had dropped
the product. In contrast to RCA's reaction to the Japanese innovations, Philips
determined to surpass the new designs with an innovative machine, for which they
launched development in 1975. Meanwhile, Philips and Grundig persisted with the old
design, upgraded in 1977 to provide two-hour recordings. The Philips V-2000
reached the market in 1980 but, despite impressive technical features, it was too
expensive and too late.
JVC exploited this opportunity to recruit Telefunken, Thomson, Thorn,
Nordmende, and other strong European brands into the VHS family. Moving quickly
with its Japanese partners, JVC had defined the technical standards for a PAL
(European color standard) VCR in 1977. JVC's readiness to supply machines on an
OEM basis, plus the evident superiority of VHS over the current Philips offering, won
commitments in rapid order from the remaining major European firms. [26]
The marketing clout wielded by the rival families is worth close analysis. All the
participants understood that VCRs would be sold as adjuncts to television and audio
equipment. A rough proxy for market power in that industry in the mid-1970s was a
company's share of the color television receiver market. At one level, the rivals
appear evenly balanced. Among the world's top ten consumer electronics companies,
the VHS and Beta groups were evenly matched, each selling slightly more than one
quarter of the color sets sold in 1976 (see Table 4 above), while Philips and Grundig
together accounted for less than one-sixth. But the VHS family was more successful
in gaining the allegiance of smaller brands. Hence, within each of the three major
17
 _·____
geographic markets, VHS started out with a market share advantage. The VHS family
-- Matsushita, JVC, Hitachi, Sharp, and Mitsubishi -- accounted for nearly 60% of
color TV sales in Japan in 1976, compared to only 37% for Sony, Toshiba, and Sanyo.
In the U.S. market, the VHS brands, led by RCA, had a 49% share of color TV sales
in 1976, compared to only41%for Zenith, Sony, Sears, and the restof the Beta family.
And by 1978, almost all the European brands not committed to the Philips format
adopted VHS, leaving Beta in a minority position.
In 1975 and 1976, all of the world's leading consumer electronics producers
climbed onto the home video bandwagon. Those that had bet wrong on video
development, choosing an inferior design approach, or electing not to invest at all,
reversed their positions and adopted one of the three contending formats. In the
course of these two years, JVC, by adroit maneuvering (and with a major boost from
Matsushita), transformed the structure of the rivalry to establish a standard format
for home VCRs. In mid-1975, Sony had stood out in a field of diverse contenders. Its
Beta design was the only format both ready for the market and capable of performing
at the level required for the mass market. By mid-1977, VHS could challenge it from
a position of parity, both in terms of product cost and functionality, and in terms of
the market power of the VHS family.
Product Differentiation
Another issue is whether the market performance of VHS resulted from
differentiating features, prices, or quality. A comparison of models introduced
during 1975-1985 by Sony, Japan Victor, and Matsushita, the major home VCR
producers, indicates some differences in all threedimensions. (Appendices B, C, D).
In general, however, at no time did either format establish more than a transient
advantage in features, prices, or picture quality.
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For example, while Sony's initial models played for 1 hour and VHS machines
2 hours, Sony increased its machine's capacity to 2 hours merely 5 months after Japan
Victor entered the market and several months before Matsushita appeared (Table 7).
Sony offered more low-priced models until 1980, when Sanyo introduced inexpensive
Beta models. Nevertheless, Matsushita quickly surpassed Sony in share once it
entered theVHS market in 1977 and theVHS standard was dominant world-wide by the
end of 1978. Beta and VHS offered basic models at similar prices, and the VHS group
included more brand names, yet Sony led in the introduction of most new features at
the same time it was losing market share to the VHS group. Between 1977 and 1983,
Sony was the first company to offer wireless remote control, half-speed and one-third
speed machines, multi-function machines (scan, slow, and still), high fidelity (hi-fi)
sound, and a one-unit movie camera (cam-corder). But, as seen in Table 8,
Matsushita or Japan Victor usually matched Sony's new.features within a few months,
and sometimes less. Japan Victor even introduced several innovations first, such as
slow/still functions, a portable VCR, and stereo recording (which Matsushita also
marketed at the same time).
While differences in picture quality are more difficult to assess, it seemed clear
that VHS models were not superior to Beta, and the truth may indeed have been the
opposite [27][28][29]. In addition, physical differences existed in the machine
weights and cassette sizes, but it remains unclear how these affected the course of
events, except that the smaller Beta cassette made it more difficult for Sony to
increase recording or playing time simply by putting more tape into its cassettes
[3] [8] [20] [30] [31].
The key issue here is that Beta machines still might have survived as an
alternative format used for high-quality recording of broadcast programs off the air,
or home movies. To achieve this, Sony would have had to distinguish Beta through
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special effects or features that made it especially convenient or superior in
performance. Yet, as with basic features and prices, Sony failed to differentiate Beta
models for a significant length of time, due to the technical skills and initiatives of
Japan Victor and Matsushita as well as their partners in the VHS group.
It also seems that Matsushita was able to counter Sony in the Japanese and U. S.
markets by utilizing its huge engineering and manufacturing resources to offer a
product line with more combinations of features and prices. Compared to Sony,
Matsushita introduced both less and more expensive VCRs between 1978 and 1981, and
manufactured about twice the number of model types Sony produced during the same
time period (Appendixes B and D). Other marketing measures helped VHS firms
overcome Sony's image for high-quality and reliability; for example, RCA and
Matsushita (which marketed Panasonic and Quasar brands in the United States) both
offered an extended labor warranty for their machines.
Mass Production and Distribution
By 1978, the VHS family had gained a significant edge in manufacturing
capability, as well as in market power. Both the Beta and VHS machines were complex
to manufacture, compared to other consumer-electronics products such as radios,
televisions, or audio equipment, and in particular required high precision for
machining the heads and sophisticated assembly skills for building the tape-handling
mechanism and other components. The difficulty of designing and then mass-
producing an inexpensiveVCR kept Ampex and RCA from entering this segment of the
market in the 1970s, even though both designed home-VCR prototypes in their
laboratories [6] [7] [19]. Philips, in addition to difficulties with product reliability,
also had to price its VCRs 20 to 30 percent higher than VHS and Beta machines ([9],
p.4).
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Both Sony and Japan Victor mastered the problems of engineering and mass
production, benefitting from experiences gained through earlier video-recorder
manufacturing. They also relied on integrated development teams for the Beta and
VHS projects that brought together members with both design and operations
backgrounds. Japan Victor, which had less experience making VCRs than Sony, paid
.special attention to making its VCR easy to manufacture and service by creating a
relatively simple, low-cost design, with fewer components or assembly steps than the
Betamax -- characteristics that appealed to companies wishing to license a VCR for in-
house manufacturing. In contrast, while Sony had the manufacturing expertise to
produce the Betamax relatively economically, potential licensees appea red concerned
over their ability to mass produce the Beta design [6] [18] [20]
[21].
Matsushita also made low-cost production a major priority as it modified the VHS
design and prepared its own plants. The company spent at least 14 months studying
manufacturing issues before formally adopting the VHS standard in January 1977.
Matsushita engineers knew what problems to expect since they had accumulated
invaluable experience in VCR mass-production from earlier machines, including a
cartridge model once made in a plant with 1200 workers and a monthly capacity of
10,000 units, as well as the VX cassette model, which Matsushita had mass-produced
in 1976 before switching to the VHS ([3], pp. 21-24, 54; [1], p. 159.) Matsushita
emphasized not only a reduction in parts but also invested in manufacturing
automation and scheduled large production runs, anticipating that its vast
distribution system would enable it to sell a great number of VCRs ( [16], pp.39-40).
Matsushita's ability to deliver low-priced VCRs with an increasing variety of featu res
also helped it to undercut Sony prices and win contracts to supply machines to
overseas distributors ([15], 4/4/77) -- arrangements that further increased
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Matsushita's scale of operations and ability tojustify additional investments in product
development and manufacturing automation.
Managers at Matsushita believed that the manufacturer to dominate the world
market would be the company that captured the largest share of the U.S. market 4],
where the major VCR distributors were likely to be RCA and Zenith, the leaders in
color television sales. Sony had already moved first after developing a 2-hour model
by establishing a relationship with Zenith, after having been rebuffed by RCA. RCA
intended to lead in the market for home-video players, but wanted lower-priced
machines as well as a longer recording time. Meanwhile, Matsushita took a strong
interest in RCA's distribution resources. These mutual interests brought RCA and
Matsushita together in negotiations for an OEM agreement after discussions broke
down between RCA and Japan Victor, which did not have the manufacturing capacity
to supply RCA with the volume of machines it wanted.
As RCA managers pondered which Japanese producer to link up with, they
reconsidered the issue of tape length. In February 1977, apparently to the
astonishment of Matsushita executives, RCA requested a VCR that "could record a
football game". This meant a recording time of at least three hours. Rather than
ending the negotiations, Matsushita launched an intensive effort to double playing
time from two to four hours by using the approach Sony had taken to double the
playing time of its one-hour machine: halving the width of each recording track
(called the track pitch) as well as slowing the recording speed. Matsushita put 70
engineers on this project alone and achieved the increase in playing time in merely two
months, as well as setting up production capacity for 10,000 units per month within
six months. By the end of March 1977, Matsushita had an agreement to supply RCA
with approximately 50,0004-hour VCRs by year's end ([1], p. 161-163; [2], p. 47).
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A large part of the VHS advantage came from the sheer ability to deliver more
machines than Beta producers could make early on in the competition. As early as
1978, because of Matsushita's massive capacity, the VHS group accounted for
approximately 66% of Japanese VCR production capacity totalling 191,000 units per
month (Table 9). Matsushita -- not Japan Victor -- thus proved instrumental in
winning over RCA and pushing theVCR competition toward the areas where Sony was
weakest: low prices and mass distribution, as well as longer playing and recording
times. Japan Victor personnel opposed a doubling of the playing time, arguing that
this constituted a 'bastardization' of the VHS (i. e., a compromise in picture quality),
and they refrained from collaborating with Matsushita in pursuing the feature. Japan
Victor eventually built a two-speed (2- and 4-hour) machine in August 1977 (primarily
to satisfy its OEM partners) but not until July 1979 did it introduce such a machine
commercially under the JVC brand name ([15], 7/11/79). Japan Victor, which had
aboutone-tenth the sales volume of Matsushita, also took six months to build a machine
with 4-hour play and 12 months to achieve a monthly capacity of 10,000 units ([15],
8/29/77).
Most important, the nature of competition changed as a result of Matsushita's
alliance with RCA. First, a bandwagon effect clearly seemed to take place in the U. S.
market as GE, Sylvania, Magnavox, and Curtis Mathes scrambled to join the VHS
group in 1977, under the rationale that the format RCA supported would probably
become the dominant machine in the American market ([15], 5/30/77, 6/27/77,
11/7/77). U.S. distributors initially had been indifferent to the choice of standards
and appeared to be waiting for clearer market signals before selecting a format.
Second, because of the longer playing time, Matsushita and its distributors, and later
other firms in the VHS group, were able to establish an image of the Beta machine as
deficient with respect to this basic feature. Sony increased the Betamax's playing
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time to 3 hours in October 1978 but not until March 1979, a year and a half after
Matsushita introduced the 4-hour VHS did Sony introduce a 4.5-hour machine (see
Table 7).
Thus, by the spring of 1977, Matsushita was able to plan a large-scale entry into
the worldwide VCR market and begin exploiting its skills in low-cost manufacturing
and mass marketing. These skills, in turn, helped RCA, which had brand recognition
as well as extensive distribution channels, offer reliable products at low prices. The
effective Matsushita-RCA combination then damaged Sony's competitive position in
both the U.S. and Japanese markets, not only because Sony's market share and
distinctiveness declined. Shortly after RCA's announcement of a reduction in prices
to undercut Sony in August 1977, Zenith demanded a renegotiation of its OEM
agreement with Sony, to whom it was paying $100 more for Beta machines than RCA
paid Matsushita for VHS machines ([15], 4/4/77). With a lag of more than two months,
Sony and Zenith responded by matching RCA's prices ([15], 8/29/77, 10/3/77,
10/31/77, 11/7/77). Yet these moves portended a difficult future: Sony would now
play the game on terms Matsushita and RCA set, and play it poorly; in fact, Sony had
trouble matching the prices of both Matsushita and Japan Victor in the low end of the
VCR market between 1979 and 1981 (see Figure 1). While Sanyo took over as the
primary supplier of the lowest-priced Beta machines, it did not have the range of
alliances or the distribution channels to which Matsushita had access.
Strateaic Alianment for Comolementary Products
Of the three principal functions of the VCR, namely, "time-shifting" (recording
broadcast programs for later viewing), home movies, and playing pre-recorded
cassette programs, it was only in the last one that the differential availability of the
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VHS format proved to be a significant factor in consumer choice of players. The blank
cassettes used for time-shifting and movies were readily available in either format.
The format did represent a potential constraint on the sharing of these tapes among
households, once recorded, but such use remained small. On the other hand, users
quickly perceived that pre-recorded tapes were more available in VHS than Beta, and
that difference appeared very salient to users intending to rent or buy programs.
Until the early 1980s, that difference did not matter much in the marketplace.
The VCR was broadly perceived to be a "niche" product, appealing primarily to
certain demographic segments. In 1980 and 1981, with VCR ownership in only 5to 10%
of television households in most advanced countries, forecasts typically projected a
leveling of demand at penetration levels of 15 to30% in the late 1980s. [22] Users gave
little evidence of interest in pre-recorded tapes. In the United States, in the late
1970s, three-quarters of all VCR owners bought no pre-recorded tapes. [15] 9/9/78,
10/16/78, 4/12/79. In 1983, several years after the beginning of the tape-rental
business, 40% of VCR owners never used such tapes and only 8% identified them as
"important."[22] p.141. With a small installed base of players, and low consumer
interest, producers and distributors of programs had slight incentive to offer much.
All that changed in the mid-1980s. Confounding the forecasts, the VCR turned
into a mass-market product, reaching 30%of American homes by 1985, five years ahead
of most forecasts, and still climbing. Sales and rentals of pre-recorded cassettes
began to grow exponentially, doubling each year from 1982 to 1986. Although at least
one leading U.S. firm concluded in 1982 that tape rentals would not be accepted by US
consumers, and that the economics of the rental business would not support a large
industry [23], entrepreneurs flocked to open rental stores in every neighborhood.
Europe stood at the leading edge of this change. VCRs began to achieve mass-
market penetration in Europe earlier than elsewhere, apparently due to the
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availability of fewer broadcast channels there. In 1983, when penetration had reached
10% in the United States and 12% in Japan, it was 29% in the United Kingdom and still
growing. Because TV-set rental was a common practice in Britain, extended readily
toVCRs, the practice of renting programs on tape was a natural adjunct. The linkages
formed by JVC and Hitachi with Thorn and Granada, the leading U.K. TV-rental
operations, led those distributors to emphasize the VHS format in tape rental as well.
Program producers and distributors, observing the preponderance of European
brands adopting VHS, tended to emphasize it over Beta and Philips formats. One
pioneer in tape production, Magnetic Video, in 1980 had three times as much capacity
in Europe for VHS production as for either Beta or V-2000. [15, 10/6/80].
In the United States, aggressive steps by RCA in the 1970s provided the first
impetus for the VHS bandwagon, when it finally started rolling in the mid-1980s.
Because of its ambitious videodisc venture, RCA had well-developed ideas about the
consumer market for recorded video programming. To promote its VCR in 1978, RCA
developed an important alliance with Magnetic Video Corporation of America [MV]. MV
was a leader in pre-recorded video (primarily used then for education and training)
and was the first to offer feature films on cassette. RCA supplied two MV program
cassettes free with each VCR in 1978, along with a membership in the MV "club." MV,
which soon found most of its growth coming in the VHS format, expanded capacity to
enable it to duplicate 2.4 VHS tapes for every Beta product. Matsushita facilitated this
by developing equipment for high-speed duplication, and rapidly making low-cost
decks available to MV and others. When the British firm, Granada, began opening
rental shops in the United States in 1980, it offered only VHS machines and cassettes.
Sony matched most of these moves, but with a lag and less effect. In 1979, Sony
linked up with Video Corporation of America, but VCA continued to promote VHS as
well. Sony also proved less effective than Matsushita in supplying equipment for
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duplication of tapes on the Beta format. As a consequence of these and other moves,
by 1980, the VHS format clearly dominated Beta in the channels for pre-recorded
tapes. According to one estimate, VHS then accounted for 70% to 90% of the revenues
of cassette dealers in the United States. [15] 12/8/80.
As the mass market began to grow in subsequent years, VHS sustained and
multiplied this initial advantage. The greater abundanceof VHS program material gave
buyers greater incentive to choose VHS players, which then led tape distributors to
stock more VHS tapes, and so on. By 1984, contrary to most forecasts made as
recently as 1980 or 1981, the sale and rental of pre- recorded tapes was a billion-dollar
business in the United States, dominated by theVHS format. [24] In 1984, Zenith, the
leading U.S. color-TV brand, switched from Beta to VHS, and the end was in sight for
the Beta format.
CONCLUSIONS
The triumph of the VHS format is an oft-cited, classic example of the dynamics
of standardization. The evidence cited here shows, however, that it is also an
important illustration of how strategic maneuvering can harness the dynamic power
of a special marketplace -- the mass consumer market -- to make a winner out of a late
entrant with a weak starting position.
In April 1975, Sony enjoyed what looked like an insurmountable lead. Its
Betamax, already on the market in Japan, was clearly superior toVCRs being offered
by major rivals, Matsushita, Sanyo, Toshiba, and Philips. It had a lustrous
reputation globally as an innovator and leader in consumer electronics. JVC, in
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contrast, a minor factor in the industry, was still struggling to perfect VHS
prototypes that seemed to offer few evident technological advantages. Two years
later, while Beta still enjoyed a lead, JVC had set in motion the fundamental forces
that would continually erode, and then extinguish, Beta's share of a massive global
market.
In retrospect, it is possible to identify the key events and to "explain" the
outcome in terms of a few factors. But as it happened, the implications of each
strategic move must have been more difficult to discern. Each of the key protagonists
acted in a way that made sense in context. Sony's behavior followed patterns that had
brought it great success over two decades. JVC, the underdog, could not reasonably
have been less humble or flexible in its relationships. Had the market grown more
slowly, as nearly all observers expected, Sony might have been able to respond more
effectively to its early mistakes.
A few important moves made the difference. JVC created a winning alignment of
VCR producers in Japan by the way its managers conducted the formation of alliances,
showing versatility and humility, where Sony pressed commitment and reputation.
The alliance with Matsushita brought huge added benefits, as the giant firm invested
massively in capacity in advance of demand and pushed the technology to meet RCA's
requirements. JVC completed the sweep by moving ahead of Sony to enlist European
partners behind VHS.
JVC's early success in aligning itself with Japanese producers made it possible
to gain an edge in the bandwagon for distribution rights. Sony's reluctance to be an
OEM supplier, and its underestimation of the threat of the VHS, left Beta in a minority
position for potential market power in the major markets of North America and Western
Europe. As the theory suggests, once VHS took the lead, it continued to gain share
year after year. The final "bandwagon," among producers and distributors of video
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software, accelerated that process. Even without the later bandwagon, the outcome
probably would have been the same in the long run. Nonetheless, the dominance of
VHS formats in tape rental channels hastened the demise of Beta and made certain that
it would not even survive as a second format.
Pasteur said "chance favors the prepared mind. " Chance no doubt played a role
in the dynamic growth of the VCR industry and the eventual success of VHS. But the
alliances JVC formed for production and distribution, and the timely strategic
commitments of its ally, Matsushita, proved to be the decisive factors in the triumph
of VHS over Beta.
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Table 1: Beta-VHS Annual Production and Cumulative Shares, 1975-1988
Units: (A) = annual production in 1,000 units; (B) = cumulative production in
1,000 units; (C) = share of total VHS and Beta production/share of total
VHS and Beta cumulative production
BETA FORMAT VHS FORMAT
Year (A)
20
175
424
594
851
1,489
3,020
3,717
4,572
6,042
3,387
1,106
669
148
(B)
20
195
619
1,213
2,064
3,552
6,572
10,289
14,861
20,903
24,290
25,396
26,065
26,213
8mm FORMAT
1984 10
1985 566
1986 1,051
1987 1,351
1988 1,531
Sources:
10
576
1,627
2,978
4,509
For 1976-1983, [32]; for 1981-1983, [33]; for 1975 and 1985-1988,
and 8mm format, Victor Company of Japan, Public Relations Dept.
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(C) (A)
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
100/100
61/64
56/58
40/48
39/44
34/39
32/35
*28/32
25/30
20/26
8/20
4/16
2/13
0.3/11
(B)
110
449
1,327
2,663
5,585
12,063
21,480
35,125
58,589
99,566
129,119
168,886
213,647
110
339
878
1,336
2,922
6,478
9,417
13,645
23,464
40,977
29,553
39,767
44,761
(C)
39/36
44/42
60/52
61/56
66/61
68/65
72/68
75/70
80/74
92/80
96/84
98/87
99.7/89
Table 2: VCR Production and Format Shares, 1975-1984
Unit: %.
1975, 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
BETA Group
Sony 100 56 51 28 24 22
Others - 5 5 12 15 11
Subtotal 100 61 56 40 39 34
VHS Group
Matsushita - 29 27 36 28 29
JVC - 9 15 19 22 18
Others - 1 2 5 11 19
Subtotal - 39 44 60 61 66
1981 1982 1983 1984 ... 1989
BETA Group
Sony 18 14 12 9
Sanyo 9 10 8 6
Toshiba 4 4 4 3
Others 1 1 2 2
Subtotal 32 28 25 20 0
VHS Group
Matsushita 28 27 29 25
JVC 19 20 16 17
Hitachi 10 10 11 15
Sharp 7 7 9 9
Mitsubishi 3 3 3 4
Sanyo - 3 4 5
Others 2 2 2 5
Subtotal 68 72 75 80 100
Sources: [32] [33] [16].
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Table 3: Japanese VCR Exports, 1975-1983
Units: value in 1 billion yen, production in 1,000 units, %
Exoorts by
75
85
60
46
32
34
27
41
BeinD/Total
... ..._
17
8
28
33
42
44
52
38
Other
8
7
12
21
26
22
21
21
Source: [9], p. 4 3 .
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1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
31
66
126
222
444
854
1,080
1,261
139
402
973
1,671
3,444
7,355
10,661
15,237
48
53
73
78
78
84
82
80
IY·lfLS-·ILZlrC
1
Table 4: Home-Video Families and World Color-TV Shares, 1976-1977
QFormat 1974 VCR Commitments
1976 World Color TV Sales
Rank Share %
Betamax prototype
V-Code in Japan
V-Code n Japan
none
Matsushita
Hitachi
RCA
Sharp
Total
Philips
G rundia
Total
VHS
.
VHS
Philips
Philips
VX-100 prototype
none
Selectavision prototype
none
N-1500 in Europe
N-1500 in Europe
Source: [34].
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Company
Sony
Sanyo
Toshiba
Zenith
Total
Beta
Beta
3
5
6
4
7.4
6.2
5.8
6.4
25.8
1
7
8
10
2
12.7
5.6
5.2
3.1
26.6
11.5
15.3
---I------------------ ----- -· ·.·
-- I-------
Table 5: Group Alignments (1983-1984)
Suppliers indicated by initials (J = Japan Victor, Ma = Matsushita, H =
Hitachi, Mi = Mitsubishi, T = Tokyo Sanyo, S = Sony, To = Toshiba, Sa
= Sanyo, P = Philips, G = Grundig)
VHS GROUP (40)
Japan Victor
Matsushita
Hitachi
Mitsubishi
Sharp
Tokyo Sanyo
Brother (Mi)
Ricoh (H)
Tokyo Juki (H)
Canon (Ma)
Asahi Optical (H)
Olympus (Ma)
Nikon (Ma)
Akai
Trio (J)
Sansui (J)
Clarion (J)
Teac (J)
Japan Columbia (H)
Funai
BETA GROUP (1
Sony
Sanyo
Toshiba
NEC
General (To)
Aiwa
Pioneer (S)
Magnavox (Ma)
Sylvania (Ma)
Curtis Mathes (Ma)
J. C. Penny (Ma)
GE (Ma)
.RCA (H)
Sears (H)
Zenith (J)*
2)
Zenith (S)*
Sears (Sa)
Blaupunkt (Ma)
Zaba (J)
Nordmende (J)
Telefunken (J)
SEL (J)
Thorn-EMI (J)
Thomson-Brandt (J)
Granada (H)
Hangard (H)
Sarolla (H)
Fisher (T)
Luxer (Mi)
Kneckerman (Sa)
Fisher (Sa)
Rank (To)
V-2000 (7)
Philips
Grundig
Siemens (G)
ITT (G)
Loewe Opta (G)
Korting (P)
B&O (P)
* In spring 1984, Zenith switch from the Beta group to VHS.
Source: [9], p. 42; and Victor Company of Japan, Public Relations Dept.
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Table 6: VCR Sales by Country and Format (1983)
Units: million units, %
Unit Sales VHS Beta V-200
U.S.A. 4.1 75 25 0
Japan 3.4 70 30 0
Britain 2.3 74 24 2
W. Germany 1.5 60 20 20
-France 0.4 70 20 10
Italy 0.2 60 20 20
Above Totals 11.9 72 25 3
Source: [9], p. 5.
Table 7: Recording-Playing Time Comparison
Year/Month BETA VHS
1975/5 1 hr. (Sony)
1976/10 2 hr. (JVC)
1977/3 2 hr. (Sony)
1977/10 4 hr. (Matsushita)
1978/10 3 hr. (Sony)
1979/3 4.5 hr. (Sony)
1979/8 6 hr. (Matsushita)
1979/8 4 hr. (JVC)
1979/12 6 hr. (JVC)
1982/3 8hr. (Sony)
1982/9 5 hr. (Sony)
Source: [4], p. 208; Victor Company of Japan, Public Relations Dept. (Appendix
C).
Note: Some of the longer playing times for Beta were achieved with thinner
tape, not new machine models.
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Table 8: Special Effects Comparison (Sony and Matsushita)
Introduction Date (Year/Month)
Wireless Remote
1/2-Speed Machine
Slow/Still
Portable VCR
1/3-Speed Machine
Scan/Slow/Still
Stereo Recording
Hi-Fi
One-Unit Camera-
Recorder
Sony
1977/3*
1977/3*
1979/3
1978/9
1979/3*
1979/3*
1980/7
1983/4*
1983/7*
Matsushita
1977/6
1977/6
1978/7
1980/2
1979/8
1980/6
1979/8*
1983/5
1985/1
JVC
1979/6
1979/8
1977/12*
1978/2*
1979/12
1979/8
1979/8*
1983/11
1984/3
Source: [16], p. 82; Appendices B, C, D
Table 9: VCR Monthly Production Capacity (1978)
Unit: 1000 machines, average monthly capacity
VHS Grou 
100 Matsushita
20 Japan Victor
6 Hitachi
126 VHS Total
Beta Group
45 Sony
10 Toshiba
10 Sanyo
65 Beta Total
Source: [4], p. 220.
36
- -- ' - - -- ·- -·
4Figure 1 VCR Price Summary Comparison
360 -
340 -
VCR Price; 320-
,000 Yen
300 -
280 -
260 -
24 -
220-
200 -
I0 1
IGO -
140 -
120 -
100 -
0
+ 
0
0 0
0
0
+0+
4
0 0
+
0
aBa
4
0 40 
0 +.
o 4
+ o O
0
0
*
9+a
4 .0 0
+ 4
a 4.00 0
8
0
0
I0 0 *
I o o C
00 0 0 '
o O + °
0 o o+
_ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~ j -
May
1975
May
1985
0 Sony
Source: Appendices B, C, D.
+ JVC 0 Matsuhita
_ __ _ ____
1_ ·___1____1_11___11__--
I I V
or
Appendix A: VCR Industry Chronology, 1974-1978
YearlMonth
1974/9 Sony proposes to Matsushita and Japan Victor that they jointly adopt the
Sony VCR under development, although development was largely
completed and Sony already had begun setting its manufacturing dies
and making other production preparations.
Sony also shows the Betamax prototype to RCA, in the hope of
persuading the U.S. firm to adopt it. (RCA subsequently abandons an
attempt to develop its own VCR but rejects the Betamax because of its
short 1-hour recording and playing time. )
Toshiba and Sanyo introduce their own VCR, the V-Code I, with 30
minute and 1-hour tapes.
/12 Sony shows the Betamax prototype to Matsushita and Japan Victor, but
still receives no commitment from them.
1975/4 Sony introduces the Betamax SL-6300 in Japan, priced at 229,800 yen
(ca. $800). 1-hour recording time.
Japan Victor announces to Matsushita that it had a competing VCR under
development, the VHS.
/7 Hitachi approaches Sony as a potential licensee of the Betamax, but is
rebuffed as Sony prefers to wait for Matsushita and modify the Betamax
for 2 hours.
/9 Matsushita introduces its own VCR model, the VX-100, with 1-hour tape.
Japan Victor also completes a VHS prototype and demonstrates this to
Matsushita and later to other firms.
/12 Hitachi adopts the VHS format.
1976/1 Japan Victor asks Sharp and Mitsubishi Electricto adopttheVHS format;
they agree by fall 1976.
/2 Sony introduces the Betamax (SL-7200) in the U.S.
/3 Hitachi, acting on behalf of Japan Victor, asks Toshiba and Sanyo to join
the VHS group.
Sony again approaches Matsushita and asks that it adopt the Betamax and
Matsushita shows the VHS prototype to Sony for the first time.
/4 Toshiba and Sanyo introduce the V-Code II with a 2-hour tape.
/5 Matsushita introduces the VX-2000, with a 100-minute tape.
Japan Victor begins manufacturing preparations for the VHS.
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/6 Sony and Japan Victor each ask the Ministry of International
/7 Trade and Industry (MITI) to back their standards. MITI proposes
/8 Japan Victor adopt the Betamax, or that the two firms negotiate on a
standard, adopt one or the other or a combination, but these suggestions
fail to be accepted.
/10 Japan Victor introduces the VHS for commercial sale in Japan with a 2-
hour tape.
/12 Hitachi begins marketing VHS machines supplied by Japan Victor.
1977/1 Sharp begins marketing VHS machines supplied by Japan Victor.
Matsushita publicly adopts the VHS format.
/2 Sanyo, Toshiba, and Zenith adopt the Betamax format.
/3 Sony introduces a 2-hour color version of the Betamax (SL-8100),
although it is not compatible with the 1-hour Betamax.
Matsushita introduces a 4-hour version of the VHS for export to RCA,
Magnavox, Sylvania, GE, and Curtis.
/4 Pioneer and Aiwa adopt the Betamax format.
/8 Sanyo reaches an agreement with Sears-Roebuck to supply it with
Betamax machines.
/10 The VHS group settles on a European standard, followed by export
agreements to several European distributors.
/11 NEC adopts the Betamax format.
1978/1 Hitachi begins in-house production of the VHS
/5 Mitsubishi begins in-house production of the VHS for export
Sources: Primarily [3] and Sony Corporation, "Table of Sony VTR History,"
Unpublished Memorandum, 16 August 1977.
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Appendix B: Sony Product Schedule, 1975-1985
Name
SL-6300
S L-7300
S L-6301
SL-7100
SL-8100
S L-8300
SL-8500
SL-3100
SL-J7
SL-J5
SL-J1
SL-J9
SL-F1
SL-F11
SL-J10
SL-J30
S L-J20
SL-F7
SL-J25
SL-F3
SL-B5
SL-HF77
SL-F5
BMC-100
BL-F17
SL-HF66
SL-HF55
SL-HFR30
BMC-200
SL-HFR60
SL-HF300
FL-F33
SL-HF500
SL-HF355
EV-A300
BMC-500
SL-HF900
CCD-V8
SL-HFR70
SL-HF505
EV-A300
EV-S700
BMC-600
SL-HF505
CCD-M8
EV-C8
CCD-V8AF
Date
May-75
Jul-75
Feb-76
Oct-76
Mar-77
Mar-77
Oct-77
Sep-78
Mar-79
Jun-79
Mar-80
Jul-80
Jul-81
Jul-81
Aug-81
Jun-82
Jun-82
Sep-82
Dec-82
Mar-83
Mar-83
Apr-83
Jun-83
Jul-83
Oct-83
Nov-83
Apr-84
May-84
May-84
Jul-84
Sep-84
Oct-84
Nov-84
Nov-84
Jan-85
Jan-85
Feb-85
Mar-85
May-85
Jun-85
Jun-85
Jun-85
Jul-85
Sep-85
Sep-85
Sep-85
Oct-85
Yen Price
229800
285000
238000
215000
255000
258000
228000
229000
279000
229000
198000
298000
165000
278000
158000
198000
137000
225000
178000
145000
199000
299000
169000
289000
132000
249800
198000
137000
289000
145000
189000
108000
185000
198000
145000
268000
239800
280000
135000
168000
145000
249800
270000
168000
198000
148000
299800
Comments
First Betamax
Price-Down/Simple Operation
2-hr Recording (Both Beta Il,11)
2-hr Recording Only (Beta II)
Portable
Multi-Function/Beta-Scan/Beta III
Portable
Stereo
Portable
Wireless Remote Control/Stereo
Price-Down
Priced-Down with Stereo
Swing Search
Portable
Hi-Fi
Micon Voice
Beta -Movie
Hi-Fi
Hi-Fi
BetaPlus (Expandability for Hi-Fi)
Beta-Movie Auto Focus
BetaPlus
Hi-Fi
Hi-Fi
Hi-Fi
8mm
Beta-Movie Auto Focus
Pro/Hi- Band
8mm Movie
Hi-Band
Hi-Band
8mm
8mm Digital
Hi - Band/Beta -Movie/Auto- Focus
Hi-Band
8mm Movie
8mm Portable
8mm Movie/Auto Focus
Source: Sony Corporation, cited in [16], p. 83.
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Appendix C: Japan Victor's Product Schedule, 1976-1985
Comments
First VHS; 2-hr, 2-head
Slow/Still; Wired Remote
Portable
Microphone Mixing
VHS Player
Portable, Slow, Wireless Remote
Slow Function
Multi-Function/Speed, 4-head Stereo
Multi-Speed, 6-hrs., 2-head
Portable, 2-head
4-head, Timer £, Counter*
i
Front-Loading, Wireless Remote
Compact (VHS-C)
Random Search Function
Hi-Fi
One-Touch Timer
Compact Camcorder;
Simplified Timer
Hi-Fi/Stereo
Compact Camcorder
Hi-Fi
Hi-Fi, Programming Remote Control
*Note: All subsequent models are 4-head
Source: Victor Company of Japan, Public Relations Dept.
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Name
H R-3300
HR-3600
HR-4100
HR-3310
HR-4000
HR-4110
HR-3500
HR-3750
HR-6700
HR-2200
HR-6500
HR-7300
HR-7650
HR-2650
HR-C3
HR-7500
HR-7100
HR-D120
HR-D225
HR-D725
HR-D220
GR-C1
HR-S10
HR-D130
HR-D150
HR-D555
HR-D250
HR-D140
GR-C2
HR-D565
HR-D160
HR-D755
Date
Oct-76
Dec-77
Feb-78
Sep-78
Nov-78
Jun-79
Jul-79
Aug-79
Dec-79
Jul-80
Nov-80
Sep-81
Jan-82
May-82
Jul-82
Nov-82
Nov-82
Jul-83
Sep-83
Nov-83
Nov-83
Mar-84
Jul-84
Jul-84
Nov-84
Dec-84
May-85
Jun-85
Jul-85
Aug-85
Nov-85
Dec-85
Yen Price
256000
279000
248000
248000
198000
225000
238000
268000
268000
188000
215000
188000
268000
208000
153000
165000
139800
148000
195000
298000
158000
288000
158000
138000
129800
218000
149800
119800
299000
189800
104800
239800
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Appendix D: Matsushita Product Schedule, 1977-1985
Name
NV-8800
NV-5500
NV-6600
NV-5000
NV-6000
NV-6200
NV-3000
NV-3500
NV-3300
NV-3700
NV-3200
NV-1000
NV-700
NV-310
NV-710
NV-100
NV-350
NV-300
NV-200
NV-750
NV-600
NV-150
NV-330
NV-800
NV-370
NV-850HD
NV-630
NV-360
NV-180
NV-7700
NV-270
NV-870HD
NV-650
NV-900HD
NV-M1
NV-550
NV-260
NV-880HD
NV-660
NV-U1
NV-M3
Date
Jun-77
Mar-78
Jul-78
ct-78
Aug-79
Oct-79
Feb-80
Jun-80
Nov-80
Mar-81
Jul-81
Nov-81
Nov-81
Dec-81
Feb-82
Feb-82
Jun-82
Aug-82
Aug-82
Sep-82
Feb-83
Feb-83
Mar-83
May-83
Aug-83
Oct-83
Nov-83
Feb-84
Mar-84
Mar-84
Aug-84
Oct-84
Nov-84
Jan-85
Jan-85
Mar-85
May-85
Jul-85
Sep-85
Oct-85
Oct-85
Yen Price
266000
238000
279000
220000
289000
268000
198000
215000
168000
298000
198000
350000
229000
163000
244000
178000
169000
139800
163000
229800
169800
189800
149800
289800
132800
239800
169800
123800
189800
189800
125000
219800
169800
229800
298000
139800
125000
189800
139800
100000
298000
Comments
2-hr/4-hr Recording
Slow/Still
Portable
6-hr Rec/Slow/Still/Stereo
Stereo
Portable
Multifunction (Scan/Slow/Still)
Wireless Remote Control/Stereo
Portable
4-head/Clean Still/Reverse/Stereo
4-head/Clean Still
4-head
Portable
Portable
4-head
3-head
Portable
3-head
Hi-Fi/4-head
3-head
Hi- Fi/4-head
Portable/4-head
4-head
3-head
Hi-Fi/4-head
4-head
Hi-Fi/4-head
VHS-Movie
Hi-Fi/4-head
VHS-Movie
Source: Matsushita Electric, cited in [16], p. 84.
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NOTES
1. Betamax is a trademark of the Sony Corporation. VHS is a trademark of the Victor
Company of Japan (JVC).
2. A useful discussion of the concept of a dominant design as well as "architectural"
variations, which seem to describe VHS and Beta as refinements of the U-Matic, can
be found in Henderson and Clark [25].
3. The dates following reference [15] refer to the weekly issue of 1Y Digest, the
leading industry trade journal.
4. JVC committed to supplying Hitachi on an OEM basis although this entailed that a
large portion of its production capacity of about 2,000-3,000 units per month would
be diverted to that end. This portion would have been significantly smaller for Sony,
which, at the time, had a production capacity of more than 7,000 units per month (see
[15] 4/21/75).
5. Kokichi Matsuno, message to employees in taking over as JVC President in 1975,
and Shizuo Takano, JVC's Video Department manager, both quoted in [2], p.41.
Another source giving a similar account of JVC's approach is [18].
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